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RECENT BOOKS · 
CRIMINAL JusTICE IN OUR TIME. By Yale Kamisar, Fred E. Inbau, 
and Thurman Arnold. Edited by A. E. Dick Howard. Charlottesville, 
Virginia: The University Press of Virginia. 1965. Pp. vi, 161. $1.75. 
The Magna Carta Commission of Virginia, in commemoration 
of the 750th anniversary of the Great Charter, has published three 
essays on contemporary problems of the criminal law, entitled 
Criminal Justice in Our Time. In view of the currently smoldering 
debates over the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions on 
the burning issues of arrest, search and seizure, the right to counsel, 
and the privilege against self-incrimination, one should be entitled 
to expect from such auspicious sponsorship the publication of schol-
arly expositions of the strongest constitutional bases for the divergent 
views expressed. Only one of the essays, that of Professor Yale 
Kamisar, fulfills that expectation admirably; the other two, by Pro-
fessor Fred E. Inbau and Judge Thurman Arnold, do not. 
In Professor Kamisar's essay, "Equal Justice in the Gatehouses 
and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure," the Supreme 
Court's inexorable march toward EscobBdo v. Illinois1 is reviewed 
through an analysis of the Court's previous decisions concerning the 
requirements of due process, the guarantee of the assistance of 
counsel, and the privilege against self-incrimination, from Griffin 
v. Illinois2 to Malloy v. Hogan,3 with critical attention, to the ra-
tionale of the Justices' opinions. Professor Inbau, on the other hand, 
in his essay, "Law Enforcement, the Courts, and Individual Civil 
Liberties," spends little time in analysis of the Supreme Court's 
decisions, but instead concentrates almost exclusively upon the prac-
tical impediments to effective police procedures imposed by those 
decisions, with specific references to the subjects of police interroga-
tion, arrest and detention, search and seizure, and wiretapping. 
Judge Arnold's contribution, "The Public Trial as a Symbol of 
Public Morality," consists of an informal commentary about his own 
efforts to free Ezra Pound from St. Elizabeth's Hospital, to which 
the poet, having been found incompetent to stand trial for treason, 
was confined for thirteen years after World War II, and about the 
efforts of Judge Arnold's partner, Abe Fortas, on behalf of Monte 
Durham4 and Clarence Gideon.5 His theme is that modem trials are 
like the morality plays of old, dramatically presenting conflicting 
moral values of the community, sometimes reflecting those moral. 
1. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
2. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
3. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
4. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
5. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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values in the judgments reached and sometimes shaping the com-
munity's moral values through the moral imperatives of those judg-
ments. 
Judge Arnold's theme received profound and scholarly attention 
a few years ago from the late Professor Edmond Cahn in his thought-
ful and provocative book, The Moral Decision.6 It deserves further 
careful exploration with reference to the criminal law. While the 
theme does not receive that kind of attention from Judge Arnold, 
his comments serve to emphasize Professor Kamisar's utilization of 
the knowledge that the Supreme Court's constitutional judgments 
are to a large extent shaped by the Justices' assessment of con-
temporary community moral values, and Professor Inbau's apparent 
disregard of those values in his efforts to assess the Court's recent 
decisions while explicitly rejecting the notion tha_t the Court should 
attempt to impose its moral judgments upon the work of the police. 
I£ a great debate in the scholarly tradition was expected by the 
editor, as his prefatory note implies, his expectations have not been 
realized. They have not, that is, unless he is content to accept what 
has become characteristic of current public debates-failure of the 
participants to agree in advance upon the weapons of debate, either 
scholarly contention or emotive polemic. Professor Kamisar chose 
the former, while Professor Inbau chose the latter; each conse-
quently suffered only crippling rather than fatal wounds, even, one 
may assume, in the eyes of the other's supporters. Fortunately, each 
will live to do battle another day, but it is hoped that they will reach 
agreement on the weapons of combat before resuming the affray 
presented in Criminal Justice in Our Time. 
I find it incredible that Professor Inbau should believe that the 
Supreme Court majority in Escobedo v. Illinois "seemed unper-
turbed"7 by the fact that the sixth amendment to the United States 
Constitution only provides that an accused shall enjoy the right to 
have the assistance of counsel "in all criminal prosecutions," and 
that it does not explicitly require counsel before the prosecution 
technically begins. Apparently· forgotten by him is the Court's re-
view in Escobedo of its prior decisions in which it had construed 
the sixth amendment's assistance-of-counsel guarantee as attaching 
at the time of arraignment, in Hamilton v. Alabama,8 preliminary 
hearing, in White v. Maryland,9 and indictment, in Massiah v. 
United States,10 the last of which was decided just one month be-
fore Escobedo. Apparently forgotten also by Professor Inbau is the 
Court's rationale in Escobedo for construing the right to the assist-
6. CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION (1955). 
7. P. 107. 
8. 368 U.S. 52 (1957). 
9. 373 U.S. 59 (1963). 
10. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
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ance of counsel as arising during police interrogation before indict-
ment. The Court stated it in the following words: 
The fact that many confessions are obtained during this period 
points up its critical nature as a "stage when legal aid and 
advice" are surely needed. . . . The right to counsel would 
indeed be hollow· if it began at a period when few confessions 
were obtained. There is necessarily a direct relationship be-
tween the importance of a stage to the police in their quest for 
a confession and the criticalness of that stage to the accused in 
his need for legal advice. Our Constitution, unlike some others, 
strikes the balance in favor of the right of the accused to be 
advised by his lawyer of his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion .... 11 . 
Throughout his essay, Professor Inbau demonstrates little regard 
for our traditional insistence upon official fairness in the prepara-
tion and presentation of criminal prosecution-in short, our insist-
ence upon due process, which can be guaranteed effectively to citi-
zens worthy even of Professor Inbau's concern only if extended also 
to those ultimately found guilty of criminal activity. For example,· 
he excoriates the Supreme Court for its decision in Escobedo, not 
only because in his view the sixth amendment does not compel, or 
even permit, the Court's holding, but also because the Court re-
quired the exclusion of "a voluntary, trustworthy confession"12 
despite the fact that an Illinois jury and, ultimately, the Illinois 
Supreme Court considered Escobedo's guilt "as having been estab-
lished beyond a reasonable doubt."13 Professor Inbau repeatedly 
castigates the Supreme Court for making the police abandon some 
of their customary practices by its insistence that constitutionally 
guaranteed rights be accorded even those suspected of crime. He 
obviously has far less confidence than the Supreme Court in the 
ability of our police agencies to perform their functions in accord-
ance with the law. Occasionally, as in his discussion of police wire-
tapping, he seems to condone official lawlessness so long as it is com-
mitted for "laudable purposes"14-whatever that may mean. To 
him, and to others of like view, the advice given by the late Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter in McNabb v. United States might profitably 
be repeated: "The history of liberty has largely been the history 
of observance of procedural safeguards. And the effective adminis-
tration of criminal justice hardly requires disregard of fair proce-
dures imposed by law."15 
Professor Kamisar's essay is a skillful example of the lawyer's 
11. 378 U.S. at 488. 
12. P. 108. 
13. Ibid. 
14. P. 133. 
15. 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943). 
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art of utilizing all available data, including what has been said in 
dissenting and concurring opinions of incumbent Justices, not alone 
to analyze and rationalize what the Court has done, but also to pre• 
diet what the Court will do in the future. The process of forecasting 
what a court will do is tricky business at best, but, as Llewellyn has 
noted, the "reckonability" of a court's future course can be en• 
hanced by paying attention to other factors than merely what has 
been held in the past.16 Professor Kamisar's discussion of Massiah v. 
United States demonstrates, by references to the dissent in Crooker 
v. Calif ornia17 and to the concurrences in Spano v. New York,18 the 
importance to judicial forecasting of dissenting and concurring 
opinions. In the Chief Justice's dissent in Crooker, he stated his 
belief that the right to counsel arose prior to indictment, during the 
time a police prisoner was being interrogated after his requests for 
counsel had been denied; in Spano, four other Justices, concurring 
in the Court's decision, indicated their belief that the right to 
counsel arose at least when the prisoner was formally charged. Thus, 
in 1964 it should have been no surprise, as it was to many, when those 
five Justices, together with Justice Goldberg, held in Massiah that 
the right to counsel attaches at least at the time of indictment. 
It seems to me that Professor Kamisar has read with correct un-
derstanding the Supreme Court's opinions he discusses, which means 
only that there is a high degree of correlation between his judg-
ments and my own concerning this aspect of the Court's recent work. 
He uses his understanding both of what the Court has done and of 
what it has said as the basis for predicting what the Court will do 
when confronted again with a case like Escobedo, but where the 
prisoner did not request counsel before confessing. To one whose 
official duties rarely permit him "to outrun the Supreme Court of 
the United States,"19 the temptation to join with Professor Kamisar 
in outrunning the Supreme Court is too heady to resist as a book 
reviewer. When he predicts that the Supreme Court will hold that 
Escob·edo "means at least what the Supreme Court of California 
said it means in People v. Dorado,"20 I think he is right. In Dorado, 
the California Supreme Court said: 
The defendant who does not ask for counsel is the very de-
fendant who most needs counsel. We cannot penalize a defend-
ant who, not understanding his constitutional rights, does not 
make the formal request and by such failure demonstrates his 
helplessness. To require the request would be to favor the 
16. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADmON: DECIDING .APPEALS (1960), 
17. 357 U.S. 433 (1958). 
18. 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 
19. In re Apportionment of the Legislature, 372 Mich. 418, 473 (1964) (separate 
opinion of Adams, J.). 
20. P. 80. 
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defendant whose sophistication or status ·had fortuitously 
prompted him to make it. . . . 
Escobedo also holds that the accused has the right not to 
incriminate himself and to remain silent, and that, if any self-
incriminatory statements are to be admissible, he must waive 
that right. Such waiver presupposes knowledge of the right to 
remain silent; in the absence of evidence of such knowledge, 
the waiver requires a warning to the accused of that right. . . . 
[O]bviously, defendant could not waive the right to remain 
silent unless he knew of that right. . . . . 
We cannot say here that because defendant did not speak 
the words of a request for counsel we need not apply the United 
States Supreme Court decisions; the constitutional right does 
not arise from the request for counsel but from the advent of 
the accusatory stage itself. We cannot compress a constitutional 
right, expressed by the United States Supreme Court, into the 
shape of a frozen formalism.21 
Nor can the rationale of the Court's decisions in Douglas v. 
California22 and Gideon v. Wainwright23 be overlooked in assessing 
the ultimate scope of Escobedo when the Supreme Court is pre-
sented with a case in which counsel is not furnished to an indigent 
prisoner who responds to police interrogation with a confession. 
Taking into consideration Douglas and Gideon, on what basis can 
it be said that the right extended to Danny Escobedo will not, or 
should not, be extended to an indigent? And, in view of Carnley v. 
Cochran,24 why should the indigent's right to the assistance of coun-
sel depend upon his request? It is apparent that Professor Kamisar 
believes, as do I, that the Supreme Court will someday grant to 
indigent prisoners the same right to the assistance of counsel that it 
said Danny Escobedo enjoyed, without conditioning that right upon 
a request. However, like the able scholar he is, Professor Kamisar 
adds a caveat which should be underscored: 
Gideon, Griffin, and Douglas only raised indigent defendants 
to a point their more affluent brethren had long since reached; 
by the time these trial and appellate advantages were extended 
to all defendants the right of the financially capable to enjoy 
them was no longer qu~tioned. In the wake of Escobedo, how-
ever, the "equality norm" exerts pressure to provide all suspects 
with the rights a Danny Escobedo may enjoy at a time when 
there is much confusion over what these rights are and more 
controversy over what they ought to be. On this occasion, the 
21. 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 177-78, 181, 398 P.2d 361, 369-71, 373 (1965). 
22. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
23. 372 U .s. 335 (1963). 
24. 369 U.S. 506 (1962). 
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impact of the equality norm is being brought to bear on a proc-
ess whose contours have yet to be shaped for the rich man.2n 
While I need not disguise my resentment at those who, like 
Professor Inbau, suggest that the supporters of the United States 
Supreme Court's recent decisions in the field of criminal law are 
dedicated to the destruction of our police forces and other law 
enforcement agencies, I can agree with at least one truism articu-
lated by Professor Inbau in Criminal Justice in Our Time. It con-
cerns a subject which those of us who proclaim our constant con-
cern for the quality of justice infrequently contemplate and even 
less frequently do anything about-the quality of the personnel, 
training, and equipment with which our police agencies are expected 
not only to enforce the laws, but to do so lawfully. Apparently it is 
evident even to him, as it is to me, that some improvement in the 
quality and effectiveness of police operations can be attained from 
"proper selection of personnel, proper training, adequate compen-
sation, promotions on a merit basis, competent internal supervision 
against abusive practices, and an absence of politically inspired 
interference regarding their operations and functions."26 However, 
until those of our officials entrusted ivith the awesome responsibility 
of administering our police agencies succeed in eradicating official 
lawlessness, as some already have begun to do, the courts must con-
tinue to insist upon strict police compliance with law and fair 
procedures, in order to safeguard against perversion of the judicial 
process into what Judge Arnold calls the mere "trappings of jus-
tice."27 Our citizens are entitled to demand no less from police ad-
ministrators and from the courts. We will fulfill that demand with-
out disruption of our established institutions, law enforcement and 
judicial, only if those engaged in destructive, unwarranted, and emo-
tional attacks upon the courts contribute their intellectual skills 
to the task of combating contemporary crime and its causes without 
violating our own Great Charter of Liberties. Chief Judge David 
Bazelon, of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, stated the perennial challenge-the real challenge: 
So the issue really comes down to whether we should further 
whittle away the protections of the very people who most need 
them-the people who are too ignorant, too poor, too ill-edu-
cated to defend themselves. Can we expect to induce a spirit 
of respect for law in the people who constitute our crime prob-
lem by treating them as beyond the pale of the Constitution? 
Though the direct effect of restricting constitutional guarantees 
w~uld at first be limited. to these people, indirectly and even-
25. P. 93. 
26. P. 135. 
27. P. 141. 
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tually we should all be affected. Initially the tentacles of incipi-
ent totalitarianism seize only the scapegoats of society, but over 
time they may weaken the moral fibre of society to the point 
where none of us will remain secure. 
Our attitude toward crime reflects our view of the value of 
the individual in society. In our deepest democratic and na-
tional commitments, we are a society of individuals. It is for 
the protection of individuals and of society that one who is 
accused of crime is deemed innocent until proved guilty and is 
afforded all the substantive and procedural legal safeguards. 
In protecting him, we protect ourselves. In a sense the entire 
system of criminal jurisprudence is "symbolic," since every part 
of it stands for something more than itself, namely, the preserva-
tion of the worth of each individual in a society of individuals. 
If we are to be true to our heritage at the same time that we 
struggle with the problems which beset us, we must deter not 
only crime, but also the debasement of the individual.28 
Theodore Souris, 
Associate Justice, 
Supreme Court of Michigan 
28. Bazelon, Law, Morality, and. Civil Liberties, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 13, 28 (1964). 
